by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Explore a new approach to old problems about knowledge, causation, and free will.
Explore a new approach to old problems about knowledge, causation, and free will.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He is core faculty in the Duke Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and has a secondary appointment in the Duke Law School. He serves as Resource Faculty in the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Partner Investigator at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, and Research Scientist with The Mind Research Network in New Mexico.
In this Wireless Philosophy video, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University) introduces contrastivism, a new approach to philosophy. At odds with traditional philosophical positions, contrastivism holds that particular philosophical concepts or positions only succeed or fail relative to contrast classes, or relevant alternatives. This approach may help philosophers resolve a number of complex philosophical issues.
In this Wireless Philosophy video, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University) introduces a new approach to the problem of free will: contrastivism. At odds with traditional philosophical approaches to free will, contrastivism holds that people are free only relative to relevant alternatives. This approach gives us two kinds on freedom – freedom from causation and freedom from constraint – and it helps philosophers resolve a number of complex philosophical issues with free will.
In this Wireless Philosophy video, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University) introduces a new approach to causation: contrastivism. At odds with traditional philosophical approaches to causation, contrastive causation holds that causal statements are true only relative to a set of relevant alternatives.
In this Wireless Philosophy video, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University) introduces a new approach to the problem of skepticism: contrastivism. At odds with traditional philosophical approaches to knowledge, contrastive knowledge holds that knowledge statements are true only relative to a set of relevant alternatives. Knowledge, in this view, is a three-place relation, as opposed to a two-place relation, as it is traditionally understood. This view of knowledge resolves the problem of skepticism.
In this Wireless Philosophy video, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University) introduces a new approach to knowledge: contrastivism. At odds with traditional philosophical approaches to knowledge, contrastive knowledge holds that knowledge statements are true only relative to a set of relevant alternatives. Knowledge, in this view, requires ruling out only the normal relevant possibilities, as opposed all relevant possibilities, as it is traditionally understood.